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Abstract: This paper analyses the determinants of banking spread in Brazil, seeking particularly to 
focus on the macroeconomic determinants of spread in recent times. It uses a VAR model to identify 
the macroeconomic variables that may directly or indirectly have been influencing spread in Brazil 
over the period 1994-2005. It presents evidence that interest rate levels and, to a lesser degree, the 
inflation rate are the main macroeconomic determinants of high banking spread in Brazil. 
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Resumo: Este artigo analisa os determinantes do spread bancário no Brasil, buscando em particular 
examinar os  determinantes  macroeconômicos  do  spread  no  período  recente.  Para  tanto,  utiliza  um 
modelo VAR para identificar as variáveis macroeconômicas que podem direta ou indiretamente ter 
influenciado o spread no Brasil em 1994/2005. Ele apresenta evidências de que o nível da taxa de juros 
e, em menor grau, a taxa de inflação, são os principais determinantes macroeconômicos no Brasil. 
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Macroeconomic Determinants of Banking spread in Brazil: An Empirical Evaluation
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1.  Introduction 
 
A  number  of  international  studies  have  highlighted  the  importance  of  macroeconomic 
factors – including rate of inflation, interest rates and interest rate volatility, GDP growth rate, capacity 
utilization etc. – in determining banking spread. Considering the macroeconomic instability that has 
characterized the Brazilian economy – expressed for example in the stop-go movement of the economy 
and the  extremely  high  short-term  interest  rates  –  it is to  be expected that  such factors  would  be 
significant in explaining spread in Brazil. This issue has gained in importance as, despite a decline in 
interest rates since mid-1999, banking spread in Brazil continues extremely high in international terms, 
and in recent years has stood at around 40%. One of the main factors preventing credit growth in Brazil 
is the extremely high interest rates levied on loans in Brazil, which explains at least partly the high 
profitability of the major retail banks. Meanwhile, the low level of credit in Brazil is one of the factors 
that have contributed to below-potential economic growth. 
In  this  connection,  Afanasieff  et  al  (2002),  using  the  Ho  &  Saunders  (1981)  two-step 
approach to investigate whether macro- and micro-economic factors are relevant to explaining spread 
behaviour in Brazil, conclude that the results suggest that the factors most relevant to explaining such 
behaviour are macroeconomic variables, such as the basic interest rate and output growth. That result is 
no surprise, however, considering that other international studies offer evidence that uncertainty in 
banks’ economic environment is one important cause of banking spreads. 
This paper intends to explore in depth the discussion of what determines banking spread in 
Brazil, seeking particularly to analyse the macroeconomic determinants of spread in recent times. The 
paper is structured into 6 sections plus this introduction. Section 2 offers a review of the literature on 
the determinants of spread, while Section 3 briefly evaluates some case studies. Section 4 sets out an 
analysis of the evolution and determinants of banking spread in Brazil. Section 5 contains an analysis 
based on vector autoregression (VAR) designed to identify the macroeconomic variables that may have 
been  influencing  banking  spread  in  Brazil  directly  or  indirectly  in  the  period  1994-2005.  Finally, 
Section 6 summarises the paper’s main conclusions. 
 
2. Determinants of banking spread: a review of the conventional literature 
 
The  conventional  theoretical  literature  on  the  determinants  of  banking  spread
1  has 
developed around two major approaches. The first (“monopoly models”) grew out of a seminal study 
by Klein (1971) and considers the bank as a firm whose main activity is to produce deposit and loan 
services intermediated by the use of bank service production technology, represented by a cost function 
                                            
* The authors thank the useful comments of Frederico Gonzaga, Gary Dimsky and José Gabriel Porcile Meirelles. All 
remaining errors are ours. The financial support of the National Scientific Council (CNPq) and Fundação de Amparo a 
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1 Banking spread can be defined overall as the difference between what the bank charges loan takers and the return it grants 
to depositors, and can be measured in two ways – which we will call “ex-ante spread” and “ex-post spread”. Ex-ante spread 
(sometimes known as “bank interest spread”) is measured by reference to banks’ prefixing decisions on rates paid on 
deposits  and  rates  charged  on  loans,  made  prior  to  performing  any  financial  intermediation  activity,  and  is  normally 
calculated as the difference between the interest rates on the bank’s loans and deposits, drawn from information on bank 
operations generally collected and published by central banks. Ex-post spread (also known as “net interest margin”) is a 
measurement of the net yield of bank financial intermediation, according to the revenues actually generated by credit 
operations and the actual cost of deposit taking, normally calculated from accounting data made available by the bank itself.   3 
of  the  C(D,L)  type
2.  As  a  rule,  the  banking  firm’s  activity  is  pursued  in  a  market  environment 
characterised by the presence of monopolistic or imperfect competition in both the credit and deposit 
markets. This means that the bank has the monopolistic power to set interest rates in at least one of the 
markets where it operates, normally the credit market, thus behaving as a price setter. This monopoly 
power is considered to explain the scale of bank operations and the related asset and liability structures, 
given that, by its decisions, an individual bank can affect the rate of return on liability components and 
on  bank  asset  components.  On  this  approach,  therefore, banking  spread  reflects fundamentally  the 
bank’s  “degree  of  monopoly”,  i.e.  its  ability  to  charge  a  higher  price  than  the  marginal  cost  of 
producing the services it offers. 
In such a context, let r be the prevailing interest rate on the inter-bank market; rl the interest 
rate charged on loans made by the bank; rd the interest rate paid by deposits with the bank; a the 
compulsory reserves as a proportion of the bank’s deposits; eL the interest elasticity of loan demand; eD 
the interest elasticity of deposit supply; C´L the marginal cost of loan services; and C´D the marginal 
cost of deposit services. Then, supposing that the bank is risk neutral
3 and that its behaviour is directed 
to maximising profits, it can be shown that the optimal interest margin on loans and deposits is given 
by
4: 
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The equations (1) and (2) state that the banking firm, operating in monopoly competition 
conditions, sets the prices of its loan and deposit services in such a way that the Lerner indices
5 are 
equal to the inverse of the interest elasticity of the loan demand and deposit supply functions. Thus, the 
less sensitive the loan demand and deposit supply functions are to interest rate variations, the greater 
will be the bank’s margin in both loan and deposit-taking operations and, thus, the greater the banking 
spread. 
If the market structure is of the oligopolistic type in both loan granting and deposit taking, 
then the optimal interest margin on loans and deposits is given by: 
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Where: s is the market-share of the n
th bank. 
                                            
2 Where D is the volume of deposits “produced” by the bank and L is the volume of loans. The traditional assumption is 
made  that  the  marginal  cost  of  loans  and  deposits  is  positive  and  increasing,  that  is 
























 (Freixas & Rochet, 1997).  
 
3 This means that bank is concerned only with the expected value of its profits, and gives no importance to dispersion of 
profits around an expected value. In that case, the bank’s aim will be to maximise expected profit, rather than maximising 
the expected utility of profit. 
4 See Freixas & Rochet (1997, Ch 3). 
5 The Lerner index, defined as the difference between the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price, measures the 
capacity to set prices above the marginal costs, being an inverse function of the elasticity of demand and of a number of 
banks. The values of the index range from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly).   4 
From  equations  (3)  and  (4)  it  can  be  shown  that  the  bank’s  interest  margins  on  loan 
operations and deposit taking is a growing function of its market share. Therefore, any reduction in the 
number of banking firms – resulting, for instance from bank mergers and buyouts – will increase bank 
concentration and thus interest margins. One of this model’s results is thus that banking spread is a 
growing function of the degree of overall bank sector concentration. 
The  second  approach  grew  out  of  a  seminal  study  by  Ho  &  Saunders  (1981)
6,  and 
conceives the bank not as a firm, but simply as an intermediary between the final loan taker (firms) and 
the  final  lender  (households).  However,  this  intermediation  activity  is  subject  to  two  types  of 
uncertainty. Firstly, there is uncertainty due to lack of synchronisation between deposits and loans. This 
lack of synchronisation entails an interest rate risk for the bank. In order to understand why, let us 
imagine that the bank encounters unexpectedly high loan demand, exceeding the volume of deposits 
and its free reserves. In this case, it will be forced to finance the surplus credit demand on the inter-
bank  market,  thus  incurring  a  refinancing  risk  in  the  event  the  interest  rate  rises  (cf.  Maudos  & 
Guevara, 2003, p. 4). On the other hand, if the bank encounters unexpectedly high deposit supply, 
exceeding the volume of loans granted by the bank in the same period, it will then have to apply those 
surplus funds on the inter-bank market. In that way, the bank will be incurring a reinvestment risk in 
the event the interest rate falls (Ibid, p. 4). 
Secondly, the intermediation activity exposes the bank to uncertainty regarding the rate of 
return on loans. That uncertainty results from the fact that a part of its loans will not be recovered 
because of non-payment, voluntary or otherwise, by loan takers. The percentage of non-performing 
loans, however, is not a variable known ex-ante by the bank, which can only estimate a likelihood of 
default. 
One feature the Klein and Ho & Saunders approaches have in common is the assumption 
that banks have market power, i.e. both approaches assume that banks are free to set the interest rates 
charged on credit operations and paid on deposits. Unlike the Klein approach, however, Ho & Saunders 
assume that the bank is a risk-averse agent. In other words, the bank’s goal is not to maximise expected 
profit, but rather to maximise the expected utility of profit. In that context, they show that optimum 
spread (s
*) is given by (Maudos & Guevara, 2003, p. 6): 
 











































- where aD is the linear intercept of the probability function of a deposit being made at the 
bank, bD is the sensitivity of the probability of a deposit being made at the bank to variations in the 
deposit interest rate, aL is the linear intercept of the probability function of a loan application to the 
bank, bL is loan application sensitivity to variations in the credit operation interest rate; C(L)/L is the 
average cost of credit operations; C(D)/D is the mean cost of deposit-taking operations; W is the bank’s 











 is the bank’s absolute degree of risk aversion
7; s
2
L is the standard 
deviation of the yield on loans (a measure of the bank’s credit risk); s
2
M is the standard deviation of the 
yield on applications/loans on the inter-bank market (a measure of the bank’s interest rate risk); sLM is 
the co-variance between credit risk and interest rate risk; L0 é is the bank’s starting stock of loans; and 
M0 is the bank’s initial net position on the inter-bank market. 
                                            
6 In what follows, we will work with the most recent extension of the Ho & Saunders approach developed by Maudos & 
Guevara (2003).  See, also, Allen (1988), McChane & Sharpe (1985),and Angbazo (1997) 
 
7 Note that, as a result of the risk aversion hypothesis, U´(.) > 0  and U´´(.) < 0.   5 
From equation (5), it can be concluded that the determinants of banking spread are: 
·  The competitive market structure: the greater the interest elasticity of loan demand and deposit 
supply (i.e. the lower the values of bL e bD), the smaller will be the optimum spread. 
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·  The volatility of market loan interest rates: s
2
M 
·  The credit risk: s
2
L 
·  The co-variance between loan risk and interest rate risk: sLM 
·  The average size of the credit and deposit operations undertaken by the bank: (L+D).  
 
One  important  aspect  of  the  Ho  &  Saunders  approach  is  that  it  leaves  room  for  the 
influence of macroeconomic variables in determining banking spread (cf. Saunders & Schumacher, 
2000,  p.  815).  The  volatility  of  interest  rates  levied  on  loans  on  the inter-bank  market  is  a  direct 
reflection of the country’s macroeconomic stability. The less stable a country’s economy – e.g. the 
greater the variation in the inflation rate and exchange rate – the greater will be the resulting volatility 
of the basic interest rate
8 and, consequently, the greater the banking spread. In such a context, spread 
can be reduced by macroeconomic policies to reduce interest rate volatility. 
Macroeconomic instability can affect banking spread through two other channels. The first 
is the degree of risk aversion. Banks’ risk aversion must to some extent reflect the instability of the 
market environment where they operate. The less stable the environment, the greater banks’ aversion to 
risk must be. Thus, a country with a history of major macroeconomic instability (high inflation, for 
instance) will have banks with a high degree of risk aversion. The second channel is the covariance 
between interest rate risk and credit risk. A highly volatile basic interest rate will be expressed to some 
extent in a highly variable level of real output. In such a context, firms’ profits will also be highly 
variable, increasing the likelihood of default at times when profits fall below expected values. Thus, 
macroeconomic instability is reflected not just in a highly volatile interest rate, but also in high credit 
risk, i.e. such instability generates high co-variance between yield on loans and yield on inter-bank 
market applications. From (5), it can be seen that the greater such co-variance, the greater will be 
banking spread. 
One final remark on equation (5): the spread given by this expression should be understood 
as “pure” banking spread (cf. Maudos & Guevara, 2003, p. 7). In practice there are other variables that 
explain banks’ net interest margin, but which are difficult, if not impossible, to incorporate into the 
theoretical model. These variables reflect institutional and regulatory aspects of banking activities. As a 
result, actual net interest margin comprises two elements: “pure” banking spread (s
*) and the “impure” 
net interest margin (f) explained by institutional and regulatory factors. 
 
3. Some International Case Studies 
 
A vast empirical literature on the determinants of banking spread has developed in recent 
years.  One  major  component  of  the  literature  has  been  concerned  with  testing  empirically  the 
theoretical model of banking spread developed by Ho & Saunders (1981). Among the most important 
                                            
8 Mainly in the case where monetary policy is conducted on the basis of the system of inflation targeting.    6 
studies taking this approach are Saunders & Shumacher (2000) and Maudos & Guevara (2003), and 
some of these studies will be described below. 
Most  of  this  work  uses  the  “pure  spread”  estimation  methodology  pioneered  by  Ho  & 
Saunders. The methodology assumes that actual spread comprises “pure” spread adjusted upwards or 
downwards by implicit interest expense (exemption from bank charges for certain classes of customer), 
by  the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  reserves  and  by  capital  requirements  resulting  from  regulatory 
standards and bank supervision. Given that context, “pure” spread is estimated in a two-step process. 
The first step involves running a cross-section regression for each bank’s net interest margin in the 
chosen country in a given year (cf. Saunders & Shumacher, 2000, p.819).  That equation is given by: 
∑ + + =
i
i jic j c ic u X NIM d g (6)  
- where:  ic NIM  is the bank’s net interest margin i in country c in the period t;  jic X is a 
vector of control variables (implicit interest expense, opportunity cost of required reserves and capital 
requirements for credit risk exposure) for each bank i in country c in some period t;  c g is the regression 
constant, which is an estimate of “pure spread” for all i banks in country c at any time t, and ui is the 
residual. 
In this first step, equation (6) is processed for each country in the sample over the study 
period. The “pure spread” estimates obtained in the first step vary over time and among countries.
9 
Accordingly, in the second step, a regression is run with panel data from the “pure” spread estimates 
obtained in the first step against a series of variables that reflect the market structure and intermediation 







c c tc s q h q g (7) 
- where:  tc g  is the “pure spread” time series (t=1,...,8) for 7 countries (c=1,...,7);  c h  is a set 
of  dummy  variables  that  reflect  the  average  effects  across  seven  countries  of  market  structure  on 
spread;  1 q  is the sensitivity of the “pure” spread to intermediation risk, and  c s  is the prevailing interest 
rate volatility on the inter-bank market. This methodology has the advantage of separating the influence 
of  macroeconomic  variables  (such  as  interest  rate volatility)  from  the  influence  of  microeconomic 
variables (e.g. banking sector market structure) on “pure” spread. 
Saunders  &  Schumacher  (2000)  obtained  the  following  results:  (i)  the  microeconomic 
variable with greatest impact on banking spread is implicit interest payment – i.e. where banks offset 
revenue lost as a result of charge exemptions by a higher interest margin; opportunity cost of reserves 
and  bank  capital  assets  ratio  also  had  a  positive  and  statistically  significant  influence  on  “pure” 
spread
10; (ii) banking sector market structure had little influence on spreads – in fact, on average, only 
0.2%  of  net  interest  margins  could  be  explained  by  banks’  market  power;  and  (iii)  interest  rate 
volatility had a positive and statistically significant impact on banking spread – indeed, on average a 
1% increase in the volatility of interest rates increases bank margins by about 0.2%. This means that 
the more volatile the basic interest rate, the greater the average spread charged by banks. 
Maudos  &  Guevara  (2004)  examine  determinants  of  banking  spread,  measured  by  net 
interest  margin,  from  data  for  1,826  banks  in  five  European  countries  (Germany,  France,  United 
Kingdom, Italy and Spain) from 1993 to 2000. They propose an extension of the theoretical model of 
                                            
9 Saunders & Schumacher (2000), for example, use a sample of 746 banks in seven countries (United States, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Switzerland) in the period 1988-1995. Repeating these cross-section regressions 
for years 1-8 of the period under study yields eight estimates of “pure” spread for each country. In this way, an eight-period 
series is obtained for “pure” spread. 
10 That is to say, high regulatory and/or endogenously determined capital ratios – as protections against risks – tend to erode 
bank profitability.   7 
determinants of spread developed by Ho & Saunders (1981), to include operating costs and a direct 
measure of the degree of competition (Lerner index) as explanatory variables. 
Maudos  &  Guevara  used  a  one-stage  panel  data  regression  in  order  to  estimate  the 
theoretical model they developed of the determinants of spread, measured by net interest margin, and 
considering as explanatory variables a number of bank and country characteristics for each period. The 
explanatory  variables  of  the  theoretical  model,  all  expected  to  relate  positively  with  spread  are: 
competitive  structure  (measured  by  the  Lerner  index),  operating  costs  (in  relation  to  total  assets), 
degree of risk aversion (ratio of net worth to total assets), interest risk, credit risk, interaction between 
credit risk and interest risk (measured by multiplying the two variables) and average size of operations 
(log of the volume of loans). 
In addition to the variables of the theoretical model, they also consider, as explanatory 
variables, implicit interest payments (measured by net operating expenditure of non-interest revenues 
as a percentage of total assets), the opportunity cost of bank reserves (ratio of liquid reserves to total 
assets) – both expected to relate positively to spread – and quality of management – expected to relate 
negatively  to  interest  margin. However,  as  a  proxy  for  quality  of  management,  they  use  the  ratio 
operating costs/revenues, an increase in which lowers quality of management, resulting in a smaller 
interest margin; thence the negative sign between the ratio and net interest margin is to be expected. 
The  results  of  that  study  show  that  most  of  the  variables  posited  by  the  theoretical  model  are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign, i.e. interest margin relates positively with the Lerner 
index, operating costs, bank risk aversion, credit risk and interest risk. Significant, positive coefficients 
were also yielded by implicit interest payments and opportunity cost of bank reserves, and significant, 
negative coefficients by the operating costs/revenues ratio, as expected by the authors. 
Brock  &  Rojas-Suárez  (2000)  conducted  an  empirical  analysis  using  panel  data  on 
determinants of banking spread in Latin American countries. Using a sample of banks in six Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Peru) over the period 1991 to 
1996,  they  investigated  why  banking  spread  had  not  diminished  in  these  countries  in  a  period  of 
financial liberalisation resulting from reforms to the banking sector, marked particularly by reductions 
in reserve requirements and in direct restrictions on credit and interest rates. For that purpose, they 
analysed  the  evolution  of  six  measures  of  ex-post  spread  (net  interest  margin),  finding  significant 
differences among these measurements in all the countries. In addition, they use the model of Ho & 
Saunders (1981) with a two-step panel regression using bank-specific variables, in order to estimate the 
determinants of spread for each of the countries individually, except Mexico. In the first step, which 
derived  “pure  spread”,  Brock  &  Rojas-Suárez  controlled  the  microeconomic  factors
11  and,  in  the 
second step, they ran a regression of the “pure spread” for each country explained by the following 
variables: interest rate volatility, inflation rate and GDP growth rate. 
The first step results indicate that some of the variables relate positively and significantly in 
some of the countries: capital-asset ratio (Bolivia and Colombia), cost ratio (Argentina and Bolivia) 
and liquidity ratio (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru). On the other hand, contrary to expectations, non-
performing loans ratio did not relate positively with banking spread in any of the countries, while in 
two countries (Argentina and Peru) the correlation was negative and significant. The authors suggest 
that this result may be associated with inadequate loan loss provisioning: higher non-performing loans 
would reduce banks’ income. In the second stage regression, using macroeconomic variables, the best 
results were given by interest rate volatility, inflation rate and GDP growth rate. Thus macroeconomic 
uncertainty, represented by interest rate volatility (Bolivia and Chile) and inflation (Bolivia, Colombia, 
Chile and Peru), related positively with spread, corroborating the results from developed countries. 
                                            
11 The variables considered are non-performing loan ratio (non-performing loans/total assets), capital ratio (equity/total 
assets),  cost  ratio  (overhead  and  other  operating  costs/performing  loans)  and    liquidity  ratio  (short-term  assets/total 
deposits).   8 
Finally, economic growth rate yielded non-significant coefficients (of varying sign) in all the countries. 
The authors conclude, overall, that spread in Bolivia is explained by microeconomic factors; in Chile 
and Colombia, by both macro and microeconomics factors; while spreads in Argentina and Peru are not 
really explained by either macro or micro variables. 
One recent study (Gelos, 2006) analyses the evolution of ex-ante spread and ex-post spread 
in Latin America and the determinants of ex-post spread in emerging countries, considering bank-
specific data in the period 1999 to 2002 for 85 developing countries, among them 14 Latin American 
countries.  From  the descriptive  evidence, Gelos observes that in the Latin American  countries the 
credit/GDP ratio is low, while ex-ante and ex-post spread levels are high by international standards. In 
his  econometric  estimations,  the  explanatory  variables  he  uses  for  interest  margin  are  bank-level 
characteristics  (measured  by  bank  size,  bank  equity,  overheads  costs  and  a  dummy  for  foreign 
ownership),  several  country-level  characteristics  (competition,  reserve  requirements,  deposit  rates, 
indirect  taxes,  legal  protection  and  availability  of  information  about  potential  borrowers)  and 
macroeconomic characteristics (GDP growth, inflation, volatility of inflation and country risk ratings). 
Gelos (2006) estimates “cross-country” regressions for 2002 and the results suggest that, of 
the bank-level characteristics, only bank size and overhead costs are significant (and relate positively). 
Of the country-level and macroeconomic features, deposit rate and reserve requirements are associated 
positively with banking spread, while GDP growth displays a significant negative correlation, a result 
associated  with  banks’  exercising  their  market  power.  However,  concentration  does  not  correlate 
significantly  with  spread,  which  the  author  associates  with  the  significant  relationship  between 
concentration and overhead costs. He also estimates panel regressions with data for 1999 and 2002, 
confirming the relationships of the significant variables in the previous regression, although reserve 
requirements  showed  reduced  significance  because  the  related  data  do  not  vary  over  time.  The 
estimation also confirms the significance of the positive coefficients for legal structure and taxes and 
the negative coefficient for foreign ownership.  In conclusion, Gelos suggests that in Latin American 
countries, interest rates are higher, banks less efficient, and reserve requirements greater than in other 
emerging countries, and that these factors have significant impact on spread. 
 
4. Overview of banking spread in Brazil 
4.1. Evolution of spread in recent times 
 
Loan interest rates charged in Brazil figure among the highest in the world, according to 
IMF figures. Figure 1 shows that, in 1994, the average spread for both corporate and the personal 
sectors was around 120% in the Brazilian banking system: approximately eight times higher than the 
second-highest rate charged in any country in the sample. The early years, when the Real Plan was 
being introduced, are now past, but the spread charged by financial institutions in Brazil continues high 
– around 55% in 1999 – although the gap in relation to other Latin American countries has narrowed. 
In 2003, average spread in Brazil was 44%, approximately three times the rate charged in other Latin 
American countries and ten times higher than in East Asian countries. 
A second important observation on the behaviour of banking spread in Brazil
12 is that it has 
tended clearly downward since 2000. As can be seen in Figure 2 below, average spread charged by 
Brazilian  banks  reached  a  maximum  of  150%  p.a.  early  in  1995,  in  response  to  the  strongly 
contractionary monetary policy measures implemented by the Central Bank in the period immediately 
                                            
12 In talking about banking spreads in Brazil, we are using the same definition as the Central Bank, according to which 
“banking spread is defined as the difference between lending and deposit rates for CDBs [certificates of bank deposit]. The 
average CDB rate for the set of financial institutions was calculated from the average of the individual rates weighted by 
each institution’s net deposits” (Banco Central do Brasil, 2002, p. 50).   9 
following  introduction  of  the  Real  Plan
13.  It  then  declined  significantly  in  the  course  of  1996  as 
restrictive monetary measures were relaxed and agents became less wary of the risk of contagion by the 
Mexican  crisis,  until  reaching  a  plateau  of  approximately  40%  at  the  start  of  2000.  Spread  has 






















Source: IEDI (2004), with data extracted from IMF and Central Bank of Brazil. 
 





















































































































































Source: Central Bank of Brazil. Note: Average banking spread related to operations with preset interest rate. 
                                            
13 In addition to the policy of positive real interest rates, these measures initially included a compulsory reserve of 100% on 
sight deposits and, from December 1994 onwards, 30% on time deposits and 15% on any credit operation. 
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One hypothesis to explain why spreads are so high in Brazil might be banks’ market power, 
evidence of which is the increasing concentration of banking in recent times. Indeed, some recent 
studies  of  the  Brazilian  banking  sector  –  e.g.,  Belaisch  (2003)  –  show  that  the  market  structure 
prevailing in this sector is essentially non-competitive. In that context, with few incentives to increase 
their operating  efficiency, banks operate with high spreads, either as  a way of  generating  revenue 
sufficient  to  cover  their  high  costs  or  as  a  result  of  their  ability  to  price  their  services  at  levels 
substantially above the marginal cost of producing bank services. 
One factor supporting the hypothesis that the problem of spread in Brazil results from banks’ 
market power is the recent tendency for bank concentration to increase. In the period 1988-2003, the 15 
largest banks’ market share in banking system total assets increased from around 29% in June 1988 to 
approximately 47% in January 2003 (cf. Central Bank of Brazil data). If the hypothesis of banks’ 
market  power  is  correct,  then  the  concentration  indices  should  also  have  an  impact  on  loan  rates 
charged by banks, resulting in high rates of return on assets. Indeed, the evidence may suggest that this 
is the case in the retail private banking sector at least, considering that mean profitability of Brazil’s 3 
largest private banks – Bradesco, Itaú and Unibanco – was 17.3% in the period 1994-2001, far higher 
than the average of 11.8% of 3 major non-financial Brazilian firms – Petrobrás, Votorantim and CVRD 
(Málaga et al, 2003, p. 12). 
The Brazilian literature on determinants of banking spread has not been conclusive on the 
subject. The studies conducted present evidence that, although the market structure of the Brazilian 
banking sector is imperfect, it does not have the characteristics of a cartel. In fact, a review by Nakane 
(2003)  of  the  empirical  literature  on  the  Brazilian  case  points  to  the  following  conclusions:  (i) 
measured by the Herfindahl index, concentration in the Brazilian banking sector is not high compared 
with indices for other countries; (ii) the market concentration indices have no statistically significant 
impact on interest rates charged by the banks; and (iii) the market structure of the banking sector does 
not correspond to either of the extreme market structures (perfect competition and cartel) and can 
therefore be characterized as an imperfect structure. 
 
4.2. Empirical studies of banking spread in Brazil 
 
One of the pioneering studies of determinants of banking spread in Brazil is Aronovich 
(1994). Using a two-stage, least-square regression, this study examined the effects of inflation and level 
of activity on spread in Brazil’s economy from the first quarter 1986 to the fourth quarter 1992, a 
period  when  Brazil  was  experiencing  high  rates  of  inflation.  The  theoretical  model  developed  by 
Aronovich  admits  that  banks  follow  a rule  of  loan  pricing  guided by  cost  structure,  regardless  of 
whether the sector is oligopolistic or not. His results indicate that inflation tends to widen the gap 
between  loan  and  deposit  rates,  i.e.  spread.  He  suggests  that  this  phenomenon  is  caused  by  the 
possibility of a re-allocation among the components of the bank assets, or even incorporating into 
mark-up the risk premium involved in credit. In that regard, inflation has a negative effect on level of 
activity by inducing an increase in bank loan rates. On the other hand, the statistical tests suggest that 
an increase in productive capacity utilization would reduce spread, thus pointing to a pro-cyclic effect. 
Another  study  by  Afanasieff  et  al  (2002)  identified  two  stylized  facts  about  spread 
behaviour after the Real Plan: (a) a marked fall in interest rates after 1995
14; and (b) persistently high 
dispersion among bank loan rates. These facts provided the rationale for applying the methodology first 
                                            
14 A more stable international environment, a fall in the overnight rate and measures adopted by the Central Bank of Brazil 
all contributed to a reduction in spreads (Paula & Alves Jr. 2003, p. 358). The Central Bank measures included particularly 
a reduction in compulsory reserve requirements, from 75% to 45% on sight deposits and from 20% to 0% on time deposits, 
new rules for loan-loss provisioning, reduction in the financial operations (IOF) tax rate from 6% to 1.5% and development 
of a credit risk centre.   11 
used to determine banking spreads by Ho & Saunders (1981). The first step involved panel data for 142 
commercial  banks  between  February  1997  and  November  2000,  so  as  to  reflect  how  spread  was 
influenced by individual (bank-level) microeconomic variables
15, i.e., those relating to bank-specific 
characteristics. From that panel, it was possible to obtain an estimate of “pure” spread (see Sections 2 
and 3 of this paper). The second step involved a structural model to estimate the long-term influence of 
macroeconomic variables – market interest rates, a measure of risk premium (C-bond spread over a US 
Treasury bond of equivalent maturity), inflation rate, output growth rate, compulsory reserves on sight 
deposits, and financial tax rates – on the “pure” spread calculated previously. 
The  results of  the first-step  regressions  show  the  following  variables  to  be  statistically 
significant:  non-interest-bearing  deposits  to  total  assets,  operating  costs,  service  revenue  to  total 
operating revenues – all of which have a positive effect on banking spread –, as well as a dummy for 
foreign banks,  whose negative sign indicates that such banks charge smaller average spreads.  The 
coefficients estimated in the second step were significant, suggesting that macroeconomic aspects are 
prominent as major determinants of spreads in Brazil. The results of the regression suggest that spread 
tends to grow with rises in basic interest rate, risk premium, output growth and taxes. Contrary to 
expectations, the rate of inflation affects spread negatively, possibly because inflation may be capturing 
the effect of banks’ appropriation of seigniorage on spread. 
Another important study of determinants of banking spread in Brazil was conducted by the 
Central Bank of Brazil in connection with the project “Juros e spread bancário” (Interest rates and 
banking  spread)
16.  Published  in  the  form  of  annual  reports  starting  in  1999,  this  study  offers  an 
accounting breakdown of spread
17, in addition to other econometric studies of the determinants  of 
spread in Brazil. Banking spread in Brazil is broken down on the basis of the margins charged by a 
sample of banks – a sample extended from 2004 onwards, to take in a larger universe (commercial 
banks and multi-banks, including state-owned ones) encompassing all the banks operating in Brazil for 
which information (on their fixed-rate, freely-allocated credit operations only) is available at each base 
date. The following components are considered: (a) a residual corresponding, by and large, to bank net 
margin; (b) tax wedge, including direct and indirect taxes; (c) Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC, 
credit guarantee fund); (d) overhead; and (e) default (provision expenses for non-performing loans). 
Figure 3 shows how each of these components participate in banking spread in Brazil, from 
2000 to 2003, now using the methodology revised in 2004
18. From the accounting decomposition of 
                                            
15 The variables selected by Afanasieff et al (2002) were: (a) number of bank branches; (b) ratio of non-interest-bearing 
deposits to total operating assets; (c) ratio of interest-bearing assets to total assets; (d) operating costs; (e) bank liquidity; (f) 
ratio of service revenue to total operating revenues; (g) bank net worth; and (h) bank leverage. 
16 See, among others, Banco Central do Brasil (1999; 2002; 2004). 
17 The accounting decomposition of spread can be carried out by way of simple accounting definitions like those presented 
here (cf. Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999, p. 381). Bank net interest margin (NIM) is defined as the ratio of the book 
value of interest revenue to the value of the bank’s assets. Let BTA be the before-tax profit, ATP the after-tax profit, TA the 
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NIM - - - + = . Thus, the net interest margin can be calculated 
residually, given that the values of pre-tax profitability, taxes paid, non-interest income, overhead and loan-loss provision 
are all known as proportions of the bank’s assets. 
18 In Figure 3 the “FGC Cost” is added to “Tax Wedge”, as the values are smaller than 0.30%. The methodology revised in 
2004 sets out a new manner of calculating overhead using Aumann-Shapley price calculation, rather than the revenue 
generation-based cost allocation approach used previously (See Banco Central do Brasil, 2004, Ch. III).   12 
spread,  the  most  important  constituent  factors  are,  respectively,  net  interest  margin  (a  2000-2003 
average of 26.9%) and overhead (26.0%), followed by tax wedge (21.6%) and provision expenses 
(19.9%).  Compulsory  reserves,  the least important  item  in  the  accounting  decomposition,  came  to 
represent a relatively more significant effect in 2002 (9.1% of spread), as a result of the imposition of 
additional compulsory reserve requirements that year. 
 
Figure 3: Accounting decomposition of spread in Brazil
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Source: Central Bank of Brazil 
 
The accounting decomposition of spread assumes that the following structural equation is 
valid: 
ln spread= 0 b Trend +  1 b  ln selic +  2 b  ln adm +  3 b  ln risk +  4 b  ln imp +  5 b  ln comp (6) 
where:  ii b  (i= 0,..., 5) are the estimated parameters, Trend is a deterministic trend that 
controls other variables which may affect spread, but are not included in the equation above
19. The 
regressors are Selic, which is the Central Bank of Brazil’s basic interest rate
20; adm, a measure of 
banks’ overhead; risk, a proxy for credit risk, measured as C-Bond spread over a US Treasury bond of 
equivalent maturity; imp, indirect taxes; and comp, compulsory reserves as a percentage of banks’ sight 
deposits. 
Eight  lags  were  used  for  all  the  estimation  variables,  including  dummy  variables  for 
January 1996, November 1997 and December 1997, so as to generate normal residuals. The equation 
thus estimated by the Banco Central was:  
ln spread= - 0,0003 trend + 0,503 ln Selic+ 1,554 ln adm + 0,219 ln risk + 0,723 ln imp (7) 
From  that  equation  it  can  be  concluded,  according to  the  methodology  adopted  by  the 
Central Bank, the average spread among Brazilian banks depends positively on the basic interest rate, 
bank overhead, risk and taxes. As the variables were expressed as natural logarithms, it follows that the 
                                            
19 These include inflation rate, level of economic activity, structural changes in the banking industry resulting from interest 
rate policy, banks entering the market etc. 
20 Selic interest rate is the interest rate for overnight interbank loans, collateralised by those government bonds that are 
registered with and traded on the Selic. This is the interest rate equivalent to the Federal Funds rate in the United States.   13 
coefficients of the equation estimated are simply the elasticity of spread to each of these variables. In 
that context, what is most striking about the Central Bank study is the high sensitivity of banking 
spread to variations in bank overhead. Indeed, from the equation estimated by the Central Bank, a 1.0% 
reduction  in  bank  overheads  would  yield  a  1.55%  reduction  in  the  spread  charged  by  banks.  In 
addition, banks’ net interest margin contributes substantially to spread composition. 
Koyama & Nakane (2001) draw on the spread decomposition methodology adopted by the 
Central Bank in order to examine the expected impact on spread of alterations in any of its components, 
i.e. overhead, loan-loss expense, indirect taxes, direct taxes and bank net interest margin. In order to 
estimate a vector autoregression, they disaggregate banking spread into the following factors: (i) Selic 
interest rate, which is used as an approximation to banks’ gross mark-up, given that time deposits and 
overnight rates behave similarly; (ii) a measure of country risk premium (C-Bond yield over a US 
Treasury  bond  yield  of  equivalent  maturity);  (iii)  the  ratio of  overhead  to  credit  volume;  and  (iv) 
indirect taxes. 
They test for co-integration among the variables and find the following relative values for 
September 2001: risk component (45%), overhead (20%), indirect taxes (19%) and Selic overnight rate 
(16%). In this analysis of banking spreads, risk-related variables played a greater part than loan-loss 
costs, as in the study carried out regularly by the Central Bank. This may be explained by the forward-
looking nature of the risk-related variables with regard to future scenarios, while non-performance 
costs, relating to past losses, are retrospective. In this way, as 2001 was a year of uncertainty in Brazil’s 
economy,  the  influence  of  the  risk  component  in  spread  increased,  as  was  to  be  expected.  The 
importance of the Selic interest rate in determining spread may be understood differently. As, a priori, 
government bonds are risk free, then the basic interest rate determines an opportunity cost in relation to 
loans to the private sector (cf. Paula & Alves Jr., 2003, p. 361). 
 
 
5. Macroeconomic determinants of spread in Brazil: 1994-2005 
 
5.1. Methodology of the empirical study 
 
The econometric method reported in this paper is Vector Auto-Regression (referred to as 
VAR below), where a variable is defined as being a function of its own lagged values and of lagged 
values of the other variables in the model. According to Sims (1980), who developed the method, the 
basic hypothesis of the VAR model is that the series should be stationary, which macroeconomic series 
generally are not. Indeed, in order to decide the best specification for a model of this type, a trade-off 
must be made – loss of efficiency or loss of information. There are three possible solutions to the 
problem. The first, recommended by Sims, is to estimate with all level variables, even in the presence 
of a unit root, on the rationale that the intention of the analysis using VAR is to determine  what 
relations exist among the variables and not the estimated parameters. However, this option is criticised 
for the loss of efficiency in the estimation. The second alternative is to make the series stationary, but 
the resulting efficiency gain in the estimation is achieved at the cost of information loss regarding long-
term  relationships  among  the  series.  The  third  option  is  to  estimate  the  model  with  Vector  Error 
Correction (VEC) when there is substantial evidence of co-integration relations among the variables. 
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Ramaswamy & SlØk (1998), however, argue that this latter option does not always ensure 
the best results, because imposing co-integration restrictions can lead to tendentious results and thus 
bias  the  impulse-response  functions.  In the  event  there is no  a  priori  theory  to suggest  either  the 
number  of  long-run  relationships  or  how  they  should  be  interpreted,  it  is  best  not  to  impose  any 
corrective restriction on the VAR model. However, as shown in this paper, there seem to be theoretical 
and  empirical  reasons  to  believe  that  long-terms  relationships  do  exist  among  the  macroeconomic 
variables considered here, making it indispensable to impose corrective restriction on the VAR model 
so as not to incur specification error. 
Thus, for the econometric exercise conducted here, the following monthly variables were 
used: (i) banking spread: defined as average banking spread related to operations with preset interest 
rate (data from Central Bank of Brazil); (ii) Central bank of Brazil’s basic interest rate (Selic rate), (iii) 
industrial output, used as a proxy of the Brazilian economic activity (data from IBGE); (iv) nominal 
exchange rate (average monthly data from IPEADATA); and (v) broad national consumer price index – 
IPCA (data from IBGE). These variables were chosen largely following the results of Afanasieff et al 
(2002), which concludes that macroeconomic variables (basic interest rate and rate of inflation) are 
more influential in determining spread than microeconomic variables. 
Figure 4 shows the behaviour of the selected variables in the period July 1994 to December 
2005. The interval chosen corresponds to the period of price stability in Brazil through to more recent 
times. 
 
5.2.  Macroeconomic determinants of banking spread: recent empirical evidence 
 
This section is directed to identifying the macroeconomic determinants of banking spread 
in Brazil. Among the variables believed to determine spread are: industrial output, rate of inflation, 
exchange rate and Selic interest rate.   15 
For the empirical application, the stationary hypothesis for the economic series was tested 
by way of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, graph analysis and the autocorrelation function 
diagram. However, none of the variables examined could be considered level-stationary
21. 
 
Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistic 
22 
Discrimination  Lag  Constant  Trend  t statistics  Critical  value 
1% 
SPREAD**  0  Yes  No  -2.499733  -2.581951 
GSPREAD*  1  Yes  No  -6.801178  -2.582204 
INTER*  0  No  No  -4.311254  -2.581951 
GINTER*  0  No  No  -13.11215  -2.582015 
EXCHA  1  Yes  No  -1.307095  -3.478911 
GCAMBIO*  0  No  No  -7.800221  -2.582204 
GDP  0  Yes  Yes  -2.944967  -4.026429 
GGDP*  0  No  No  -13.72341  -2.582076 
IPCA*  0  Yes  No  -9.552496  -3.478547 
GIPCA*  0  No  No  -10.13972  -2.582076 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Eviews 5. Significance is indicated by * for the 1% level and ** 
for the 5% level. 
Lag Length: Automatic based on Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). 
 
After ascertaining the order of integration of the variables, Johansen’s co-integration test 
was carried out, with linear deterministic trend in the data, intercept and no trend in the co-integration 
equation
23. The trace statistics ( trace LR ) and maximum eigenvalue ( max LR ) indicate the presence of a 
co-integration vector, as can be seen in Table 2. 
 






trace LR   % 5 , trace CV   Prob** 
0 = r   0 > r    0.374345   104.9376*   69.81889   0.0000 
1 £ r   1 > r    0.171706   41.62855   47.85613   0.1694 
2 £ r   2 > r    0.068009   16.19631   29.79707   0.6984 
3 £ r   3 > r    0.030479   6.687948   15.49471   0.6142 






max LR   % 5 max, CV   Prob** 
0 = r   1 = r    0.374345   63.30900*   33.87687   0.0000 
1 = r   2 = r    0.171706   25.43225   27.58434   0.0919 
2 = r   3 = r    0.068009   9.508357   21.13162   0.7894 
3 = r   4 = r    0.030479   4.178729   14.26460   0.8400 
           
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Eviews 5. 
                                            
21 Although the ADF test signalled that the series IPCA, SPREAD and INTER (interest rate) are stationary, the graph 
analysis, and particularly the correlogram analysis, pointed in the opposite direction; for these reasons, they  were not 
considered level-stationary. 
22 The letter  G before of each variable means variation rate. 
23 This specification seems to be the most appropriate for the macroeconomic series analysed in this study.   16 
Note: * Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
**MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
 
Although  a  long-run  relationship  does  exist  among  the  variables,  some  short-term 
imbalances  may  occur.  In  that  case,  a  model  with  error  correction  must  be  estimated,  i.e.  VAR 
including a co-integration vector to correct for these short-term imbalances so as to bring it into long-
run equilibrium. This study, therefore, requires estimating a restricted VAR (with an error correction 
mechanism) in order to correct the short-term deviations in long-term equilibrium. 
In order to develop a suitably specified model it is necessary, among other things, to choose 
an appropriate number of lags for estimation. This was done on the basis of the Schwarz Information 
Criteria (SIC)
24. The statistic indicated that the number of lags to be included in the VAR is one (Table 
3): 
 
Table 3 – Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag Length  Schwarz Information 
Criteria  
1   -5.88906 
2   -5.48896 
3   -5.26309 
4   -4.74989 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Eviews 5. 
Note: Data from July 1994 to December 2005. 
 
Considering that the errors are orthogonalized by the Cholesky decomposition in estimating 
the VEC, ordering the variables becomes significant to analysing the impulse-response function and the 
variance decomposition. For this purpose, the Granger (1969) time-precedence test was used. This is 
one way of ranking the variables from “most exogenous” – those affected contemporaneously only by 
their own structural shock – to the “most endogenous” variables – affected contemporaneously by all 
the shocks. That said, the results are shown in Table 4: 
 
Table 4 – Granger Causality Test 
VEC (1)       
Null Hypothesis:  Obs  F-Statistic  Prob 
       
  GINTER does not Granger Cause GIPCA  136  0.13832  0.71055 
  GIPCA does not Granger Cause GINTER    1.67346  0.19804 
  GGDP does not Granger Cause GIPCA  136  0.00775  0.92998 
  GIPCA does not Granger Cause GGDP    0.06274  0.80260 
  GSPREAD does not Granger Cause GIPCA  136  1.85078  0.17599 
  GIPCA does not Granger Cause GSPREAD    1.22444  0.27049 
  GEXCHA does not Granger Cause GIPCA  136  2.41605  0.12247 
  GIPCA does not Granger Cause GEXCHA    0.81543  0.36815 
  GGDP does not Granger Cause GINTER  136  0.84506  0.35962 
  GINTER does not Granger Cause GGDP    15.7833  0.00012 
                                            
24 The formula is as follows: SIC = - (l/T) + klog(T)/T, where l is the log-likelihood function with k parameters estimated 
using T observations. Analysis of the number of lags was based on the Schwarz Criterion and on the analysis of the lack of 
serial correlation of the residuals.   17 
  GSPREAD does not Granger Cause GINTER  136  4.57062  0.03435 
  GINTER does not Granger Cause GSPREAD    6.14345  0.01444 
  GEXCHA does not Granger Cause GINTER  136  4.3457  0.03902 
  GINTER does not Granger Cause GEXCHA    1.95435  0.16445 
  GSPREAD does not Granger Cause GGDP  136  2.8919  0.09136 
  GGDP does not Granger Cause GSPREAD    1.41018  0.23714 
  GEXCHA does not Granger Cause GGDP  136  0.54734  0.46071 
  GGDP does not Granger Cause GEXCHA    1.15918  0.28359 
  GEXCHA does not Granger Cause GSPREAD  136  1.81582  0.1801 
  GSPREAD does not Granger Cause GEXCHA    0.89514  0.34581 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Eviews 5. 
 
According to these criteria, the suitable order is the following: GIPCA (inflation rate), 
GEXCHA (exchange rate), GINTER (interest rate), GGDP (GDP) and GSPREAD. Thus the banking 
spread variation rate (the variable  of interest to this study) is the most endogenous, and  responds 
contemporaneously to variations in output, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate. 
It is common to analyse the results of the (restricted or unrestricted) VAR model by way of 
the impulse-response function and decomposition of variance. Given the monthly frequency of the 
data, a 12-month period after the shocks occurred was used in the analyses. 
The impulse-response function is used to test the sensitivity of certain variables to certain 
shocks, and is useful mainly for ascertaining the time, direction and reaction pattern of responses to one 
standard deviation impulses (shocks) in contemporary and future values of the endogenous system 
variables. In that context, system response to shocks is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Impulse Response Function of a Change in Spread Growth over Growth of Other 
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The first graph shows that an inflation rate growth shock tends to cause a persistent rise in 
banking spread growth. This result agrees with the result obtained by Aronovich (1994), who showed 
that inflation rate rises are associated with increases in banking sector mark-up. The following graph   18 
shows the effect of an exchange rate growth shock on banking spread growth, which was also positive 
although of little significance. The last graph in the first row shows the positive effect of a shock in 
growth of the interest rate on growth in spread; this can be considered the shock that had greatest 
impact  on  growth  in  banking  spread.  This  result  confirms  the  hypothesis  of  banks  preference  for 
liquidity (cf. Paula & Alves Jr, 2003), according to which – in view of the existence of a risk-free 
application combining liquidity and profitability (indexed public bonds) – banks in Brazil came to build 
a high liquidity premium into their loan-making operations. Added to this, as mentioned in Section 2, 
Selic interest rate rises may lead to greater variation in real output levels and business profitability, thus 
raising credit risk, which can result in higher loan rates and increased spreads. 
Before explaining the results of the following graph, note that the negative impact of GDP 
on banking spread can be attributed to the “default effect”, in that greater (lesser) growth in output and 
national income result in a reduction (increase) in bank default (and credit risk), which tends to incur a 
reduction (increase) in spread, while the positive impact on spread growth is probably due to the bank 
“market power” effect. In the latter case, banks may respond to a context of growing demand for credit 
by raising the loan rate and maintaining the deposit rate unchanged. 
That said, in the first of the second row of graphs, a GDP growth rate shock can be seen to 
cause  a  convergent-oscillating  effect  on  the  banking  spread  growth  rate  –  which  seems  to  reveal 
contradictory effects in the relationship between these two variables. The second graph in the second 
row shows the impact that a positive banking spread shock tends to cause on the banking spread 
variable itself. Note that, as with other economic variables, there is a strong inertial component to 
spread, which is demonstrated by the fact that shocks to this variable (or to its growth rate) at time t 
affect the variable’s values in subsequent periods. 
Table 5 shows the decomposition of variance, which is designed to identify the importance 
of a given variable in relation to observed error in the values forecast for another variable. The results 
were obtained from a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 iterations. Note that growth in the inflation 
rate accounted  for  approximately 4% of the variance in banking spread  growth. The results show 
interest rate  growth to be the most significant  variable, because it has a strong (i.e. around 33%) 
influence on variance in banking spread growth. As regards the importance of banking spread growth 
in explaining banking spread itself, this was found to be about 61%, confirming the hypothesis that 
there  is  a  strong  inertial  component.  The  other  variables  were  found  to  be  of  negligible  relative 
importance as regards spread growth. 
 
Table 5. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (%) - Rate of Change in Banking spread  
Period  GIPCA  GEXCHA  GINTER  GGDP  GSPREAD 
1   0.490944   0.023440   20.94865   1.377739   77.15923 
2   3.956152   0.464427   31.87199   1.109975   62.59746 
3   3.324432   0.627901   28.57153   0.996260   66.47988 
4   3.658873   0.549939   31.05942   1.033745   63.69802 
5   3.625943   0.573453   31.02841   0.928944   63.84325 
6   3.748606   0.561272   31.95413   0.820816   62.91518 
7   3.773342   0.565717   32.20051   0.727486   62.73295 
8   3.820436   0.560330   32.59733   0.652313   62.36959 
9   3.846327   0.559770   32.83500   0.590334   62.16857 
10   3.874389   0.558033   33.06895   0.538990   61.95964 
11   3.894406   0.557093   33.24848   0.495813   61.80421 
12   3.913239   0.556036   33.40838   0.459029   61.66331 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using Eviews 5 
Note: Ordem Cholesky GIPCA, GEXCHA, GINTER, GDP and GSPREAD   19 
 
All in all, the recent evidence seems to indicate that basic interest rate (Selic) is the most 
significant variable for explaining growth in banking spread in Brazil. In addition, inflation rate was 
found to have a positive effect on banking spread growth, a result that is associated with increased bank 
sector  mark-up,  but  which  cannot  currently  be  considered  one  of  the  major  determinants  of  high 
banking spread in Brazil. As regards the other variables – growth in exchange rate and in industrial 
output – there is no evidence that these are significant in determining the banking spread charged in 




The results obtained in this study – in agreement with the empirical literature – provide 
evidence that macroeconomic factors are important in explaining how banking spread is determined in 
Brazil. Particularly noteworthy are (i) the interest rate level, which serves both as a basic level for loan 
rates and an “opportunity cost” for loan operations, because part of the public debt in Brazil is indexed 
to the Selic interest rate; and (ii), to a lesser extent, the rate of inflation, because increases in the 
inflation rate are associated with increases in bank sector mark-up. 
Lastly, for the purposes of proposing policies to reduce banking spread in Brazil, the results 
of this study seem to indicate that a reduction in the Selic interest rate is a necessary condition for 
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